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Heilman: Treatment of Capacity to Contract in Conflict of Laws Cases
WEST fIBGINIA LAW

QUABTERLY

TREATMENT OF 'CAPACITY TO CONTRACT IN CONFLICT
OF LAWS CASES.
RAYMOND J. HEILMAN*

The decision of a ease often depends upon the conception which
is held of the fundamental nature of the problem presented in the
controversy. Perhaps in no field is this more true than in that of
the "conflict of laws." And it may be ventured that in no other
has resulted more confusion and inconsistency in adjudications as
a result of failure to analyze the legal problems in particular cases
down to their foundations and even their sub-structures, or as a
result of failure to agree upon such analysis. Because of the additional complexity which the "conflict of laws" phase gives to a
case which might be difficult enough if it involved a purely domestic controversy, in no field of the law is clear comprehension and
therefore sound and thorough analysis of each particular problem
more needed or desirable. It is proposed to consider the nature
of "the conflict of laws problem" in general and then with reference to a few cases of a particular type and to show the significance
of fundamental analysis in affecting the result of judicial determinations.
The term "conflict of laws" suggests to the imagination a combat off in space between rivals contending with lance and shield
for supremacy. Who are those contenders? Are they juristic
champions who have surmounted to the dignity and degree of a
"law" and must they fight to extinction to see which one is foreordained to survive? Or are they combatants of the status of mere
"rules", contending for the favor of the sovereign who will confer
upon the successful one, the name of "law"? If we assume that
if the second question is answered in the affirmative, the surviving
champion will be all-powerful in his status or station as victor
even as against the nominal sovereign of the realm where this contest takes place, we have in this picture a somewhat fantastic illustration of a fundamental difference of conception of the nature of
a "conflict of laws problem".
*
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A court of state A, is confronted with a group of facts, of which
a part have taken place in state X and a part in state Y. If all
of these facts had occurred in state X, there would be a domestic
rule of that. state clearly applicable to them; if they had all happened in state Y, its domestic rule, different from that of state X,
would apply. Suppose further that state A, in which the case
comes up, has a third domestic rule by which the controversy would
be decided if the facts were local to state A. What is the question
with which the court must now deal? Is it whether "te law" of
state X or of state Y or of state A, (apart from the fact that the
forum is in state A), governs the case so as to compel or require any
forum to apply the domestic rule of that state or one homologous
with it? Does a particular state become the law-giver for the
forum, wherever it may be, on the group of facts involved in the
case so as to leave the problem that of ascertaining which state that
is, and is the "rule" of that state inherently appropriate or required to be applied as "law"? So it would seem if it is true that
"the topic called 'conflict of laws' deals with the recognition and
enforcement of foreign-created rights"' or that "rights being created by law alone, it is necessary in every case to determine the law
by which a right is created"', or that "a right having been created
by the appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow everywhere. "3 Or would a more accurate analysis of the problem bring the state A court to conclude: "None of the so-called
rules of state X, state Y or state A, pertain to this case for each
is merely a domestic rule relating only to cases involving groups
of facts which are localized within the state and not pertaining to
cases involving groups of facts which include an extra-territorial
element. As this is a conflict of laws case, in which each of these
domestic rules of states X, Y and A is inapplicable, and it is befoie
this, a state A court, state A is the law-giver for the case and the
problem for the court is to determine what the state A conflict of
laws rule is for the group of facts involved. We will be determining our own law, not applying the law of some other state, although
the rule which we shall apply may happen to be identical in scope
and effect with the domestic rule of state X or state Y or of some
1

BRALB, SUMMARY

OF THE CONFIJCT OF LAWS,

in

3

CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF

LAWS (1902) 501.
2 BnATs , Op. cit. supra, n. 1, p. 515, § 41. This section continues:
"The creation of a personal obligation, which has no situs and results from
some ast of the party bound, is a matter for the law which has to do with those

acts. A personal obligation, then, Is created by the law of the place where
the aots are done out of which the obligation arises."
BAMXz,op. cit. supra, n. 1. p. 517, §47, continuing: "Thus an act valid where
done cannot be called In question anywhere."
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other state or with our own domestic rule or with the conflict of

laws rule of some other state?"
That the definition of the "topic of conflict of laws" as dealing
"with the enforcement of foreign-created rights" is not casual or
inadvertent, but describes a concept actually held, clearly appears
from the statements of writers and judges, only a few of which
will it be necessary to quote from illustratively to show that this is
a fact. In addition to the statements of Professor Beale, which
have been set forth above, he has also said 4 in discussing what rule
should be applied to decide the question of the validity of a contract (in a conflict of laws case): "In all these cases the
matter must, it seems, be determined theoretically by the law governing the transaction, i. e., the law of the place where the parties
act in making their agreement. If by that law their acts have no
legal efficacy, then no other state can give them greater effect. If
by the law of that state their acts created a binding obligation upon
the parties, then the parties who have acted under that law must be
bound by it." Notice that he assumes that the agreement in question is already binding as a contract if the so-called "appropriate
law" (it would be better perhaps to say "appropriate rule", as we
shall see) would declare the agreement a binding contract if all the
facts pertaining to it were purely domestic, even before the question ever reaches the court which has the conflict of laws problem
to solve, whereas the agreement in question is one which is essentially different from one of the kind which the so-called "appropriate law" purports to cover, not being purely domestic or local
but being one which involves an element or elements extra-territorial to that state, whose rule is declared by the last quotation to
be "governing" as law.
Again Professor Beals says,' quoting his own summary,0 "the
question whether a contract is valid, that is, whether to the agreement of the parties the law has annexed an obligation to perform
its terms, can on general principles be determined by no other law
than that which applies to the acts, that is, by the law of the place
of contracting. If the law of that place annexes an obligation to
the acts of the parties the promisee has a legal right which no other
law has power to take away except as a result of new acts which
change it. If on the other hand the law of the place where the
agreement is made annexes no legal obligation to it, there is no
4 23 Hav. L. REv. at p. 268.
3 BEALm, Op. cit. supra, n. 4, at pp. 270, 271
a BF-A=, op. cit. supra, n. 1, § 90.
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other law which has power to do so." He goes on :7 "So far is this
the case that it is everywhere agreed that where a statute of the
state where the parties contract applies to the contract, no other
law, whether that of the place of performance or any other can
avoid the effect of the statute.8 This doctrine gives full scope to
the territoriality of law and enables each sovereign to regulate acts
of agreement done in his own territory." The general doctrine
now being discussed, that in a conflict of laws case what the court
has to do is to enforce a foreign-created right not determine a conflict of laws rule of its own which may (or possibly may not) adopt
and apply a rule similar in scope to the domestic rule which would
be applicable if all of the facts occurred in the jurisdiction in
which, in the last quotation the agreement of the parties is treated
as having taken place, is founded certainly, upon an idea of the
territoriality of law, but that this is an idea which is inaccurate
or at least incomplete and one-sided, is, I think, shown in the very
last sentence quoted. Does not the description of law as "territorial" mean that each state is sovereign, that is, all powerful,
within its own territory and if that is so as to each state is it not
true that no one state can regulate as against another, any matter
which comes up for the latter to deal with in its own exclusive territory ? Yet, is not the statement now spoken of actually intended
to express not only that, but also that the state in which the acts
are treated as having taken place, which constituted the agreement
in question, has power to regulate outside of its own confines and
in and upon the state in which the conflict of laws case is before
the court, the legal effect which the latter state, through its court,
shall give to the acts of agreement said to have been done in the
first state? Does not "territoriality" truly mean that neither state
may interfere with the other as to the functioning of their respective courts in the declaration of what is "law" for each? The conception here expressed by Professor Beale connotes that the first
state shall be supreme as to the legal consequences which it shall
attach to acts occurring within its limits, that the second state may
not interfere therewith, but the first state can regulate or dictate
what the second shall do with the case, if the question comes up to
it, as to what legal consequences the second state shall attach to
the acts which have taken place in the first state and upon parties
whose interests are before a court of the second state not one of the
BALf,
B7

op. cit. supra, n. 4, at p. 271.

aCiting Fowler v.

Equitable Trust Co., 141 U. S. 384, 12 Sup. Ct. 1, 35 L. ed.

786 (1891) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 177 U. S. 389 (1900).
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first state, for adjudication. In other words the doctrine expressed
seems to come to this: That the first state may so operate extraterritorially on the second, that the second may not even operate
intra-territorially on the group of facts involved in the case, the
issues and parties of which are solely and exclusively before one
of its courts.
The first state would be imposing a conflict of laws rule upon the
second state, for we must not fail to keep in mind that only part
of the facts in the case occurred in the first state and therefore its
domestic rule is inapplicable as "law" in the case.
Minor apparently takes the same view as Professor Beale for he
says: "The only law that can operate to make a contract is the
law of the place where the contract is entered into (lex celebrationis). If the parties enter into an agreement in a particular
state, the law of that state alone can determine whether a contract
has been made. If, by the law of that state no contract has been
made, there is no contract. Hence, if by the lex celebrationis,the
parties are incapable of making a binding contract, there is no contract upon which the law of any other state can operate, it is void
ab initio.10
In Slater v. Mexican NationalRailway Co,1 Mr. Justice Holmes
says: "The theory of the foreign suit is that, although the act complained of was subject to no law having force in the forum, it gave
rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which like other obligations, follows the person and may be enforced wherever the person may be
found." However, it is only fair to note and it is significant that
just above the sentence quoted, Mr. Justice Holmes says ('this was
a wrongful death case and will be more fully discussed below):
"As Texas has statutes which give an action for wrongfully causing death, of course, there is no general objection of policy to enforcing such a liability there, although it arose in another jurisdiction. But when such a liability is enforced in a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the wrongful act, obviously that does not mean
that the act in any degree is subject to the lex fori, with regard to
either its quality or its consequences. On the other hand, it equally little means that the law of the place of the act is operative outside its own territory." 12 In the last sentence, (italicized) Mr. JusMINOR, TEHATISS ON CONFICt OF LAWS

(1901),

171.

Minor uses the term lex celebrationiM Instead of the term lex looi contracuo
meaning the law (rule of law) of the place of the making of the contract as distinguished from the law (rule of law) of the place of performance, (tex loci sofu15

tioni8).

11 194 U. S. 120, 126, 24 Sup. Ct 581, 48 L. ed. 900 (1904).
32 The italics are the present writer's.
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tice Holmes adopts a qualification which apparently Professor
Beale, as noted above, does not recognize as true, judging by his
statement which we concluded could only mean that the state in
which the acts forming the operative facts of the case, took place,
could regulate the matter of what legal consequences shall be attached by the state of the forum. Even with the limitation set by
Mr. Justice Holmes however, his theory is still that the problem is
one of the "enforcement of foreign created rights."
If this way of regarding the problem were always inconsequential in effect on the result of the decision in a case having one or
more elements foreign to the forum, there would be no worthwhile
purpose served in testing the truth or correctness of this viewpoint.
On the other hand, if a difference in the legal consequences of the
operative facts in a case may depend upon whether the problem
which the court has to solve is the "enforcement of foreign-created
rights" or of the determination by the forum of its own "law"
for the controversy and its own right-duty and other legal relations, it is very important to see which of these conceptions is
sound or the sounder of the two and to adopt a basic conception
which explains the problem in the case as it is. Professor Cook
has, I think, thoroughly proved, quite recently,'13 that this difference of analysis which we are now considering not only brings
about actual differences of result in the decision of cases but in
some instances, radical and striking differences. In order to make
this appear most clearly, it seems unavoidable to use. two or three
or the cases which Professor Cook has taken as illustrations 4 and
to re-present here, the essentials of his treatment of the point.
In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York 5 Judge Cardozo
said: "A foreign statute is not law in this state, but it gives rise
to an obligation, which, if transitory, 'follows the person and may
be enforced wherever the person may be found.' 8 'No law can
exist as such, except the law of the land, but * * * it is a principle
of every civilized law that vested rights shall be protected.' The
plaintiff owns something, and we help him to get it.' We do this
18 Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 457.
The writer wishes here to acknowledge his debt to Professor Walter Wheeler Cook
for his ideas of the subject of Conflict of Laws, gained chiefly as a student under
Professor Cook in that subject.
24 Especially the Slater Case, supra, n. 11, the Loucks Case, infra, n. 15, and
Guinness v. Miller, infra, n. 20.
s 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. B. 198 (1918).
Citing Sliater v. Mexican National Railway Company, supra, n. 11, and other
cases.
ce Citing several cases and BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT Or LAws (1916)
§§ 51, 73.
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unless some sound reason of public policy makes it unwise for us
to lend our aid. 'The law of the forum is material only as setting
a limit of policy beyond which such obligations will not be enforced
there.' ,,18
Compare what Judge Learned Hand said in a recent Federal
case:' 9 "Coming then to the actual issues, I have to decide what
person the company must recognize as a shareholder. In deciding
that question I can only follow the law of the place where I sit.
It is indeed commonly said that, when a court must consider the
legal effect of events happening elsewhere, it enforces foreign law.
That I conceive is a compressed statement, which it is at times
useful to expand. Of necessity no court can enforce the law of
another place. It is, however, the general law of all civilized peoples, that in adjusting the rights of suitors, courts will impute to
them rights and duties similar to those which arose in the place
where the relevant transactions have occurred." In Guinness v.
Miller" the plaintiff sought to recover a debt owed by a German
defendant on an account stated in Germany on December 16, 1917,
and payable in Germany in marks. The question was whether the
amount of the recovery (stated in dollars) should be based on the
exchange value of marks in dollars as of the date when thd account
was stated in 1917, or of the date of the Court's decision in 1923.
If the court were enforcing a German right, created in Germany,
it should of course reach the same result as would have been reached by a German Court sitting at the same time, which would be to
allow the recovery of so many marks and then translate the amount
into dollars at the rate of exchange existing at the time of the
judgment or decree. The Court, however, decided that it was
dealing with a right existing by virtue of the law of its own jurisdiction, that this right arose at the same time that the right existing under German laws was created and therefore its scope was
defined in a sum expressed in marks and translatable in dollars
as of that time. Judge Hand argued from the analogy of a tort
obligation, saying :*' "When a court takes cognizance of a fact
committed elsewhere it is indeed sometimes said that it enforces
the obligation arising under the law where the tort arises. And,
if this were true, it would seem to follow that the obligation should
be discharged in the money of the sovereign in whose territory the
18 Citing Cuba R. R. Co. -v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 478, 32 Sup. Ct. 132, 51 L. ed. 274,
35 L. I. A. (N. S.) 40 (1911).
1
Direction Der Disconto-Gesellscbaft v. U. S. Steel Corp., 300 Fed. 741 (1924).
"
291 Fed. 769 (1923).
Supra, n. 20. p. 770.
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tort occurred, and that the proper rule would be to adopt the rate
of exchange as of the time of the judgment.
"However, no court can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign and when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction foreign to the
place of the tort, he can only invoke an obligation recognized by
that sovereign. A foreign sovereign under civilized law imposes
an obligation of its own as nearly homologous as possible to that
arising in the place where the tort occurs. But since, apart from
specific performance, such an obligation must be discharged in the
money of that sovereign, none other being available, the obligation
so created can only be measured in that medium. The form of the
obligation must therefore be to indemnify the victim for his loss in
terms of the money of the foreign sovereign and that obligation
necessarily speaks of the time when it arose; that is when the loss
occurred."
Let us take one more actual decision to show how a difference in
fundamental theory may effect a difference in result, the decision
in Slater v. Mexican National Railway Company22 previously
quoted from. Action was brought in a federal court in Texas to
recover for an alleged wrongful death which was caused and occurred in Mexico, under a Mexican statute providing a method of compensation unusual for an American Court, at least in this kind of
a case, requiring periodical payments by the losing defendant, subject to modification by the court, but after all not so very unlike
the method applied frequently to alimony payments. The proceeding was at law and recovery was denied upon the ground that the
court had "no power to make a decree of this kind contemplated
by the Mexican statutes." Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Harlan and Peckham dissented upon the ground that "the method of
arriving at and distributing the dmages pertains to the procedure
or remedy" and therefore was governed by the law of the forum.
The keynote of Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion was contained in the
following extract, part of which has already been quoted: "The
theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of
was subject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an
obligatio, an obligation, which like other obligations follows the
person and may be enforced wherever the person may be found.
But as the only source of this obligation is the law of the place
of the act, it follows that that law determines not merely the exist23
ence of the obligation but equally determines its extent."
23

Supra, n. 11.
Supra, a. 11, Zoc. cit.
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Would not a better solution of this case have been for the federal court sitting in Texas to have recognized a iight of recovery
of its own (i. e., of its own applicable body of law) because of the
Mexican statute and to have afforded the plaintiffs a remedy in
such manner as it saw fit, as nearly analogous to the Mexican
method as its judicial machinery made possible? On the reasoning of Judge Learned Hand in Guinness v. Mi~ler and the later
federal case in which he said, "I can only follow the law of the
place where I sit * * * Of necessity no court can enforce the law
of another place,"125 could it not have done so?
Let us now examine a few cases dealing with the specific problem of so-called contractual capacity of married women, after first
noticing the apparent trend of authority on the subject of capacity.
On the continent of Europe, the doctrine generally followed has
been to treat the question of capacity as determined by the "personal law," which formerly was the rule of the domicile (lex
domicilii) and now more commonly is the rule of the nationality
(lex patriae). What the prevailing view is in England at the
present time appears to be uncertain.2 7 Formerly the rule favored
seems to have been that of the place where a contract was regarded
as having been made. Since the case of Sottomayer v. Do Barros8
in which it was said: "As in other contracts so in that of marriage, personal capacity must depend on the law of domicile", the
rule has been in dispute, the lex domicilii being said on the one
hand to "determine capacity" to contract, except that the lex
loci celebrationis must also be complied with in the case of marriage contracts,2 9 the view being taken on the other hand that the
former rule (that of the place where the contract is regarded as
having been made) still prevails in commercial contracts." In
this country the tendency and prevailing practice is undoubtedly
to apply the same rule to determine capacity that would be applied to determine the question of the validity in general (essential validity), the rule of the place where the contract is regarded
=

Supra, n. 20.
Supra, n. 19.

2

LORENZEN, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS RELATING TO BILLS AND NOTES, 1919, p.

21

65, n. 26.
LORENZEN, op. cit., supra, n. 26, p. 61; Male v. Roberts, 3 Esp. 163 (1800).
3 P. D. 1, 5, 47 L. J. P. &
M. 23, 37 L. T. Rep. N. S. 415, 26 Wkly. Rep. 445
(1877, C. A.).
29 WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, (5th ed., 1912), pp. 43-40. 61;
LORENZEN, Op. cit. supra, n. 26, p. 63.
w DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAws, (2nd. ed., 1908), Rule 149, Exception 1, p. 588;
LORENZEN, Op. cit., supra, n. 26, p. 63.
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as having been made (lex loci contractus).31 An exception is applied, in at least some states, that where it "would contravene the
established policy of the forum, having for its object" the protection of infants and married women, the courts of the domicile of
either an infant,32 or of a married woman, 33 "may decline to enforce their contracts entered into in a foreign state, and valid, under the law of such state." '4 "Whether these rules apply to infants contracts cannot be stated definitely." 35
Two leading cases involving the question of the power of a married woman to make a contract (in an interstate transaction), in
which differing results were reached with the respective courts
failing to appreciate, apparently, that the solution of the problem
comprised anything else than a determination of which of two
domestic rules "governed". were Milliken v. Pratt,8 decided in
Massachusetts in 1878 and Fremnan's Appeal3" decided in Connecticut in 1897.
In the former case, Mrs. Pratt, a married woman domiciled in
Massachusetts with her husband, there signed and gave to him,
addressed to a Maine firm, an offer to guarantee payment by Mr.
Pratt up to a certain amount if certain goods were shipped by them
from Maine to him in Massachusetts. Pratt posted the letter containing this offer of guaranty in Massachusetts and the goods were
shipped as requested. The action was brought by members of the
firm against Mrs. Pratt, on her guaranty agreement. Under the
Maine local rule, married women were under no disability from
making contracts like this agreement. At the time of this transaction, married women were under such a disability under the
Massachusetts local rule, although a statute doing away with that
disability had been passed in Massachusetts after the transaction
in question and before action was brought in the case. The court
held that Mrs. Pratt was bound by the agreement.
Notice that this was an agreement which would be a unilateral
contract if any, acceptance being by shipment of the goods by, the
Maine firm. Mrs. Pratt was not at the time in Maine, neither was
her husband. The Court, however, treated her as having made a
1 Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Marshall, 108 Ia. 518, 79 N. W. 282 (1899) ; Thompson v. Taylor, 56 N. J. L. 253, 49 At]. 544, 54 L. R. A. 585; 88 Am. St. Rep. 485
(1900) ; Bell v. Packard, 69 Me. 105, 31 Am. Rep. 251 (1879).
8 International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. . 722 (1912).
23 First National Bank v. Shaw, 109 Tenn. 237, 70 S. W. 807, 59 L. R. A. 14,
25 L. R. A. 188, 34 Am St. Rep. 473 (1893).
a' LORMNZEN, Op. Cit. supra, n. 26, pp. 63-64.
3 LOIRHNZEN, op. cit. supra, n. 26, pp. 64-65.
w 125 Mass. 374, 28 Am. Rep. 241 (1878).
9 68 Conn. 533, 37 At]. 520. 37 L. R. A. 472, 57 Am. St. Rep. 112 (1897).
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contract there and at the same time applied the Maine rule to determine that there was such a contract binding upon her. Chief
Justice Gray said "The question therefore is, whether a contract
made in another state by a married woman domiciled here, which
a married woman was not at the time capable of making under the
law of this commonwealth, but was then allowed by the law of that
state to make, and which she could now lawfully make in this commonwealth, will sustain an action against her in our courts.'""
Two things are conspicuous in the above quotation and in the decision as a whole. One is that the court says this was "a contract
made in another state" (Maine) by a married woman, when she
had not been in Maine at all. No acts of hers had occurred in
Maine. The most that can be said is that some consequences of
her acts occurred there. How does the court set up a contract as
made by her in Maine? Of course it is by what has been called
the "last act" test under which in applying the rule that the validity (for example) of a contract is determined by the law of the
place where it is "made", it is said that a contract is made where
the last act takes place which makes the contract complete, in the
case of an agreement consisting of actions or happenings some of
which occur in one state or country and some of which occur in
another. A contract, or rather a contractual obligation, like any
other obligation, being a legal concept cannot, of course, have location in space although it may be convenient to ascribe to it such a
location. Moreover there is nothing especially sacred about the
last act or event in a transaction as distinguished from the first
or any prior act or event equally essential among the component
elements, except that when it occurs all the required elements can
be said to be present. Offer and acceptance are equally important.
In continental countries like significance is sometimes given to the
"'first" act, e. g., that of signing an instrument. Such a test as
that spoken of, may, however, be useful as a device by which to
uniformly apply a rule such as the so called rule that the law of
the place where the contract is "made", determines the validity of
a contract, a rule which works as well, perhaps, as any other would.
However, it is preferable not to say, for example, that a contract
i.. "made" or is "binding" in the place where such last act occurs
for to do so is to assune a conflict of laws rule of that place to
exist, by which a contract is recognized as binding-it is to assume
the answer to the question you are asking. You cannot say that a
Supra. n. 36, at p. 377.
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contract or rather that an agreement is binding (as a contract)
anywhere until you know the conflict of laws rule of that place.
The court also says:" "If the contract is completed in another
state, it makes no difference in principle whether the citizen of this
state goes in person or sends an agent or writes a letter across the
boundary line between the two states. *
So if a person residing
in this state signs and transmits either by a messenger or through
the post-office, to a person in another state, a written contract
which requires no special forms or solemnities in its execution and
no signature of the person to whom it is addressed, and it is assented to and acted on by him there, the contract is made there, just
as if the writer personally took the executed contract into the other
state or wrote and signed it there." Further on, the court continues: "The contract between the defendant and the plaintiffs
was complete when the guaranty had been received and acted on
by them at Portland and not before. It must therefore be treated
as made and to be performed in the state of Maine."
Notice that the language of the court is that the "contract" was
"made", and of course if what is meant is the word "contract" in
its technical legal sense as distinguished from the term "agreennt" then the court is assuming the answer to the question in
controversy, for that question is whether or not there is a "cotract" as to this married woman so as to bind her upon her guaranty agreement.
The other feature of the decision striking to us after the analysis
which we have attempted to make of the fundamental problem in
conflict of laws cases, and this no doubt has been apparent in what
has already been said, is that the court did not once distinguish
the problem involved from such a problem as would have arisen
had all of the facts in the case happened in Massachusetts. The
court, apparently, did not recognize any difference between a conflict of laws case and a domestic case, as to the applicability of
domestic rules-the very point above all, which the court should
not fail to see but which perhaps oftener than any other, the courts
do overlook. The court in this case seems never to doubt, but, on
the other hand, to take it for granted that the local decisional rules
and local statutes of Maine and Massachusetts, or those of one of
the two states, are as applicable as if everything had happened in
Iaine or in Massachusetts. No limitation is spoken of or even visioned so far as can be discerned, to the effect that the Maine statU' Supra, n. 36, at p. 376.
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ute or the Massachusetts statute may merely express a local or
domestic rule, having intra-territorial facts in mind, and therefore
be clearly inapplicable. If the legislature of Maine or the legislature of Massachusetts had in view that the statutes respectively
should apply to cases wholly or partly extra-territorial in their
facts, so that the statutes were declarations of conflict of laws rules
of the respective states, no such distinctive feature of the statutes
is mentioned by the court for it says simply, "The law of Maine
authorized a married woman to bind herself by any contract as if
she were unmarried. Pub. Laws Me. 1866, p. 31, c. 52; Mayo v.
Hutchinson, 57 Me. 546. The law of Massachusetts as then existing, did not allow her to enter into a contract as surety or for the
accommodation of her husband or of any third person." Gen. Stats.
1860, c. 108, p. 3. Nourse v. Henshaw, 123 Mass. 96." Both Mayo
v. Hutchinson and Nourse v. Henshaw, cited by the court, were
cases involving purely domestic facts. To use Professor Cook's
expression, the court apparently did not "sense the actualities of
the situation."
What these "actualities" are in regard to this
case he explains most clearly :40
"First let us notice that the usual way of stating the problem
cannot be taken literally. If the statement that "by the law of
Massachusetts, W lacked capacity to bind herself" means that
by law this married woman, W, lacked capacity to bind herself
by this transaction to this P in Maine, we need go no farther,
The case is decided for a Massachusetts Court. The statement
thus literally interpreted means that under Massachusetts law
this defendant, W, is not bound to this plaintiff, P; but that is
just what we are trying to find out and by hypothesis do not
know. If the statement means anything, it must therefore not
be taken literally. What we really start with is a knowledge of
the Massachusetts law applicable not to this W but to another
W, in a hypothetical case similar to this but differing in that,
all the facts are, so to speak, Massachusetts facts. In other words,
all we know is the Massachusetts "domestic rule", using that
phrase in the sense already defined.
"Is the statement made, be it noted, in stating the problem
raised by the case-that "by Maine law W had capacity to bind
herself", to be interpreted differently? We may give it a literal
meaning, but I venture to think that that is wrong, in the sense
that it does not describe accurately what the Massachusetts court
knew. Let us look at the facts. Did the Massachusetts court
really know at the outset-when stating the problem for solution
-what rights this plaintiff would have been recognized by the
Maine Courts as having against this defendant? Note that for
4O Coox,

op. cit. supra, n. 13, at pp. 471-473.
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the Maine Court as well as the Massachusetts Court this case
presents a problem in the conflict of laws. Note also that merely by knowing that Maine has a statute "removing the disabilities of married women" we do not know how a Maine court
would deal with a Massachusetts woman all of whose acts took
place in Massachusetts, even though her letter was read and acted
upon by a Maine plaintiff in Maine. To know how a Maine court
would decide this very case necessarily involves a study of the
Maine rules as to the conflict of laws. I find no evidence that the
Massachusetts court had such knowledge either when it stated the
problem before it or later when it decided the case. I find no
evidence that it ever tried to get it. Had the Massachusetts
court embarked upon this arduous and perilous adventure (of
trying to learn how the Maine Court would treat this married
woman domiciled in Massachusetts and whose only actions were
done there), it might have found-treating Maine for the moment as a name standing for any other state than Massachusetts--that the Supreme Court of the other state would say that
its statute removing the disabilities of married women applied
only to married women domiciled in its own state or to married
women entering into agreements while actually within the state
or that the capacity of a married woman to contract is governed
by the "law" of her domicile or some other "law". Note that
if, on finding that the cases in the other state said that the capacity of W was to be settled by the "law" of her domicile, the
MAsachusetts court were to interpret "law" to mean the rule
which W' domicile (Massachusetts) would apply to the very
case, it would become involved in a discussion of the interesting
game of international lawn tennis known as the "renvoi."
"If, as seems clearly to be the case, the Massachusetts court in
fact contented itself with ascertaining the Maine "domestic
rule," applicable to a purely Maine group of facts, it could not
of course know whether by the law of Maine this defendant, W,
was under a contractual duty to this plaintiff, P, or not, and so
could not know whether there was a Maine-created right for it
to enforce."
In Freer6mn's Appeal41 an Illinois bank forbore action on a debt
of an Illinois partnership, on receipt of a written guaranty agreement signed by Mrs. Mitchell in Connecticut, where she and her
husband, who was one of the partners, were domiciled, and by the
members of the firm in Illinois. The guaranty agreement was signed by the partners in Illinois, taken by Mr. Mitchell from Illinois
to his wife in Connecticut, where she signed it and returned it to
him. He mailed the guaranty instrument in Connecticut, to one
of the partners in Illinois and the latter delivered it in Illinois to
the bank. The bank brought action against Mrs. Mitchell on the
dt Supra, n. 37.
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guaranty agreement. By the local law of Connecticut, a married
woman was under legal disability from executing a contract of this
kind. By the local rule of Illinois there was no such disability.
The court held that there could be no recovery against Mrs.
Mitchell on the alleged guaranty contract, applying the domestic
rule of Connecticut to the case as if it were a conflict of laws rule
and without recognizing the difference between the two.
The court (per Baldwin J.) declared the issue to be whether or
not Mrs. Mitchell under the law of Connecticut had the legal power
tc authorize her husband to take the guaranty instrument in that
state and deliver it to the creditor in Illinois and thereby give it
legal effect, saying "Had Mrs. Mitchell been within the State of
Illinois when she signed the guaranty, it may be that her personal
presence would have so far made her a resident of that state as to
subject her to its laws in respect to acts done within its jurisdiction.
But, as whatever was done in Illinois to bind her to the bank was
done under an agency constituted in Connecticut, it is the law of
Connecticut which must determine as to the authority of the agent
and so as to the validity of the obligation which he, as such, undertook to impose upon her by the delivery in Chicago of the paper
signed by her in Bristol." 42
In the first place the court seems to fail to distinguish that there
is a conflict of laws problem requiring any more for consideration
than taking the choice of two domestic rules purporting to relate
only to intra-state groups of facts. Secondly, the court decides the
case on the basis that the Connecticut domestic rule, that of the
place where the agent, the husband, was given his authorization
by the married woman permitting him to enter into an agreement
for her in Illinois, was imposed on the case as on a primri principle
as if by some supra-legal compulsion, failing to realize that there
was any Connecticut conflict of laws rule to apply or to work out
for the case, distinct from what we have spoken of as the domestic
rule.
That in Freeman'sAppeal43 the court assumes that the Connecticut domestic rule as to the capacity of a married woman to make
a contract of the kind in question determines the issue (whether a
married woman in Connecticut has the legal power, through her
agent, to make a contract imposing a guaranty liability upon herself as to her husband and others in Illinois) as an inflexible a
'

Supra, n. 37, at p. 541
Supra, n. 37.
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priori principle without recognizing that conceivably the domestic
rule referred to might not necessarily apply since some operative
facts in the case happened in another state and without recognizing that the Connecticut conflict of laws rule for this very case
might possibly not be the same as the, domestic rule (bearing in
mind that if all the operative facts had occurred in Illinois the Illinois domestic rule would apply and would declare that such a contract as was attempted to be made could be made by a married
woman there) is strongly indicated by the fact that the court
makes a territorial division of the operative facts in the case, dividing them into two parts, the authorization group of facts in Connecticut and the guaranty contract group of facts in Illinois (if
we may so designate these as separate groups) and treats the former as being governed by the Connecticut rule as to capacity a,
separate and distinct from the latter, which (except for the legal
effect already stamped upon the Connecticut group of facts by the
Connecticut rule. as the court looks at the matter) it treats as
thereafter governed by the Illinois rule. The court. says that the
Connecticut rule determines the validity of the authorization given
in Connecticut; then if the authorization is a valid one, the ]llinoi.
rule (or rules) determine whether (from other standpoints) there
is a valid contract; if the authorization is not valid by the Conneeticut rule then it is not legally possible for a contract to be entered
into in Illinois through the intended agent. We have noted that
in Milliken v. Pratt" the Massachusetts court assumed that all facts
in the case (some of which occurred in Massachusetts and some in
Maine) were governed by the Maine (domestic) rule. Here the
court assumes that part of the facts (those of the authorization)
were governed by the Connecticut domestic rule so that there could
be no valid contract in Illinois, and that. as to those facts which
occurred in Illinois, the Illinois local rules (apart from the authorization facts) would govern them. May we not ask at this point: Is it
at all clear that if this case of Freeman's Appeal, taking the fact.
as they actually were, had come up for adjudication in Illinois, the
Illinois court would be reqzdred to hold that Connecticut law had
already stamped the character of legal ineffectiveness or inoperativeness on the authorization which had occurred in Connecticut
so that it, the Illinois court, could not hold the agreement which
was consummated in Illinois, a valid contract binding on the married woman who had sent the signed guaranty instrument from
-a

Supra, n. 36.
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Connecticut by her intended agent? If what the court appears to
express as the ratio decidendi is correct, it would seem that our
question would have had to be answered by saying that no different decision could have been rendered had the case come up in
Illinois, for the Connecticut court says: "The agency by virtue
of which the delivery was made, was created, if at all, in Connecticut. 4 But to create an agency is to enter into a contractual relation.
Mrs. Mitchell had no capacity to make any contract whereby her legal position in respect to all or any of the other members
of the community would be varied. It would have varied it in respect to her husband could she have constituted him her agent to
put her, by the delivery of an instrument of guaranty, in the situation of a surety for his debt to a third party. He therefore derived no authority from her to make the delivery to the bank, and,
as to her, the instrument never was delivered. It is true that the
guaranty, if a binding contract, was a contract made in Ililnois.
It might also be assumed, so far as concerns the law of this case
(although this is a point as to which we express no opinion), that
it was one to be performed in Illinois, and that as to the principals
in the transaction, it was fully an Illinois contract, and to be governed by the law of Illinois, as respects any question as to its validity. By that law, a married woman was free to enter into such an
engagement, and to constitute an agent for that purpose. But the
lox loci contractus is a rule of decision only when there is a contract, so made as to be subject to that law. It is a petitio principii
to say that, because the guaranty was delivered in Chicago, it is
therefore to be held effectual or ineffectual, as against Mrs. itchell,
by the law of that place. The underlying question is, was it, as
to her, ever delivered at all? It was not so delivered unless delivered by her authority; and by the laws of Connecticut, where she
assumed to give such authority, she could not give it.""
The domestic rule as to capacity of either Illinois or Connecticut and its conflict of laws rule as to capacity in this case may be
identical in scope (analogous) but need not be necessarily. A different problem, as to which purely domestic cases are not precedents, is presented in the conflict of laws case for it is the very
inapplicability of the domestic rules of either jurisdiction or of all
the jurisdictions in which one or more of the operative facts have
taken place, which creates a conflict of laws problem.
46 The relation of principal and agent may, of course, exist without any contract

between principal and agent, e. g., the agency may be entered upon gratuitously as
It apparently was In this case.
41
Supra, n. 37, at p. 540.
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It may have been, however, that the court in our present case,
merely gave artificial or mechanical reasons for a decision which
was actually based upon its desire (or rather the desire of the law
as interpreted by the court) not to permit a woman domiciled in
Connecticut to make a contract of guaranty in behalf of her husband in a conflict of laws case any more than in a domestic case,
that is, upon policy against permitting a Connecticut married
woman sending an agent to engage in such a contract for her in
Illinois to accomplish what she would not be allowed to effectuate
under the domestic rule of Connecticut if the ultimate agreement
of guaranty were engaged in, by her personally or through an
agent, right in Connecticut. If that is what the court really had
in mind, then it did mean to lay down a conflict of laws rule analogous or homologous to the Connecticut domestic rule, although it
may not have been conscious of that fact. That such is the real
ratio decidendi of the decision may be indicated by the following
language of the opinion: "Engagements which coverture prevents a woman from making herself she cannot make 'through the
interposition of an agent, whom she assumes to constitute as such
in the state of her domicile. If this were not so, the law could always be evaded by her appointment of an attorney to act for her in
the execution of contracts. No principle of comity can require a
state to lend the aid of its courts to enforce a security which rests
on a transgression of its own by one of its own citizens, committed
within its own territory. Such was in effect the act by which Mrs.
Mitchell undertook to do what she had no legal capacity to do, by
making her husband her agent to deliver the guaranty to the bank.
He had no more power to make it operative by delivery in Chicago
to one of his creditors in Illinois than he would have had to make
it operative by delivery here, had it been drawn in favor of one
of his creditors in Connecticut. It is not the place of delivery that
controls, but the power of delivery.""
In M iUiken v. Pratt" no such question of policy was involved
for the Massachusetts court, which said: "In Massachusetts, even
at the time of the making of the contract in question, a married
woman was vested by statute with a very extensive power to carry
on business by herself, and to bind herself by contracts with regard
to her own property, business and earnings: and,. before the bringing of the present action, the power had been extended so as to in47 SuprG, n. 3?, at p. 542.

48 Supra, n. 36.
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elude the making of all kinds of contracts, with any person but her
husband, as if she were unmarried. There is therefore no reason
of public policy which should prevent the maintenance of this ac-

tion. "49
The assumption that a domestic rule of a given jurisdiction is
necessarily its conflict of laws rule also and inexorably attaches
where the facts of a ease are similar but contain one or more extraterritorial elements is dealt a heavy blow by those decisions which
on the ground that to do so would defeat established policy of the
forum, refuse to recognize as super-imposed and binding upon the
forum or as obligatory or as necessarily appropriate, the rule which
is the established domestic rule of another jurisdiction, within
which one or more of the operative facts in the case have taken
place, although not denying and sometimes even admitting that
such rule might be obligatory or necessarily applicable if it were
not for some special consideration of public policy (of the forum)
involved in the case.
It would seem that if the rule which happens to be the domestic
rule of a foreign jurisdiction in a case which is in all respects similar except that the ease is a domestic one, must necessarily be applied in other conflict of laws cases which do not involve this special
consideration of policy as a matter of supra-legal compulsion or
a prioriappropriateness, based on the geographical distribution or
incidence of the events which are the operative facts in the case,
it would have to be applied notwithstanding the objection to it by
the court of the forum, based upon policy. If the solution of the
problem is merely mechanical, depending upon the territorial or
geographical incidence of the various phenomena which make up
the operative facts in the case, as between the respective jurisdictions in which those events or facts have occurred, then it would
seem that neither this or any other consideration or objection based
on policy would prevent the mechanical principle from determining the decision. If "policy" is not to be considered in other
types of cases, why should it be in this type of case? If vital in
this particular kind of case, why may it be ignored in other cases
and where should the line be drawn? It does not seem possible to
draw such a line anywhere if "policy", that is, a social reason or
object, is conceived to be the foundation of every rule of law.
When a court has a case before it which raises a conflict of laws
problem which has never been raised before in that jurisdiction,
u9
upra, n. 36, at p. 383.
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must it not always decide from every standpoint of the "policy"
of the forum what it shall determine the conflict of laws rule for
that jurisdiction to be for this particular problem? To say that
in some types of cases there is an a priori principle which dictates
that a certain rule which happens to be the domestic rule of a foreign jurisdiction must be applied by the forum without question
is to say that in such cases any and all matters of so-called "policy" of the jurisdiction in which the court sits are eliminated so
that the court cannot consider them. Such a statement is obviously
untrue.
A representative decision in which the court in its view of the
problem refrained on the ground of established policy of the forum.
from applying the domestic rule of another jurisdiction was First
National Bank v. Slaw.r"' The question was whether the defendant, a married woman domiciled in Tennessee should be held liable
on a promissory note signed by her in Tennessee, nmde payable in
Ohio to an Ohio bank and sent by her to the bank by mail after
execution. The Tennessee domestic rule at that time was that the
contracts of a married woman were voidable; the Ohio domestic
rule was that such contracts were valid. The court said: "The
first question, of course, to be determined is whether, upon the
facts found, this is a Tennessee or an Ohio contract. * * * We
think it quite plain that the note in suit is an Ohio contract, notwithstanding it was signed by Mrs. Harley in Tennessee, it having
been delivered and consummated in Ohio, and is payable in that
state, as the place of performance.
"The next inquiry is whether the plea of coverture to a note
made in Ohio, valid and enforceable against a married woman in
that state, is available in a suit on said note in this state, where
such a contract is voidable at the election of the married
woman. "5l The court (McAlister, J.) pointed out that in Milliken
v. PratP2 the Massachusetts court had held binding on a married
woman domiciled in Massachusetts, an agreement of guaranty for
her husband's benefit regarded by the court as having been made
in Maine, although at that time under the Maine local rule such
an agreement by a married woman was invalid, but that the latter
rule had since been changed by statute, that decision was not at
all inconsistent with the Massachusetts policy at the time of the
trial, in regard to the agreements of married women domiciled in
'r

109 Tenn. 237, 70 S. W. 807, 59 L. R. A. 498, 97 Am. St. Rep. 840 (1902).
fiWra, n. 50, atp. 239.
supra, m. 36.
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Massachusetts. The Massachusetts court in that case had itself
made that differentiation saying in conclusion: "There is therefore no reason of public policy which should prevent the maintenance of this action."" The Tennessee court, after making the
above observation, went on to say: "But in Tennessee the contracts of a married woman are voidable, and will not be enforced
against her when there is a plea for coverture. It would be a
strange anomaly to hold that such a contract made by a married
woman in Tennessee would not be enforced by our courts, while the
same contract, if made in another state, would be valid and enforceable. As stated by Mr. Justice Gray, in Mifliken v. Pratt,
supra: 'As the law of another state can neither operate nor be
executed in this state by its own force, but only by the comity of
this state, its operation and enforcement here may be restricted by
positive prohibition of statute. * 0 * Itis possible, also, that in a
state where the common law prevailed in full force, by which a
married woman was deemed incapable of binding herself by any
contract whatever, it might be inferred that such utter incapacity,
lasting throughout the joint lives of husband and wife, must be
considered as so fixed by the settled policy of the state for the protection of its own citizens that it could not be held by the courts
of that state to yield to the law of another state in which she might
undertake to contract."
"While it is true, as construed by counsel in his very able argument, that the tendency of legislation in Tennessee is to enlarge
the contractual power of married women, yet such power is very
limited and circumscribed, and the settled policy of this state is
to declare negatory contracts made by her whenever her plea of
coverture is interposed." 5 4
Perhaps the best demonstration that the courts are never actually
bound in any way to take the domestic rule of a foreign jurisdiction and apply it in a conflict of laws case is that when they feel
disinclined on what they consider a serious enough ground, which
they usually speak of as an objection of public policy, they do not
feel compelled to take the rule and apply it in the ease, but without
their poWer to refrain from doing so being seriously doubted by
anyone, they successfully refrain from applying the rule. 5
Supra,n. 36, at p. 383.
Bpra, n. 50, at p. 242.
See Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 83 YALU
L. J. 736, 747: "If some power other than that of state A prescribes for A the rule
that is to govern 'on principle', if that rule is obligatory upon state A. how can
state A deny effect to such rule in a particular case? If state A is bound to recog.
nize the exclusive power of state B to attach legal consequences to certain operative
c
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In Armstrong v. Best"5 decided in accord with the Tennessee
case just discussed, Shepherd, C. J., said:"
"The contract then, being a Maryland contract, it is next insisted that it is one which a feme covert could have made in that
state, and therefore enforceable in the courts of North Carolina.
We are by no means certain that the present contract is a valid
one, according to the laws of Maryland, as the statute of that
state seems to recognize the legal capacity of a married woman
only to the extent of contracting with reference to property acquired by her 'skill, industry, or personal labor.' Assuming,
however, that it is a valid contract in Maryland, we will proceed
to the examination of the question whether it should be enforced
by the courts of this state."
"It is well settled that the law of one state has, proprio vigore,
no force or authority beyond the jurisdiction of 'its own courts,
and that whatever effect is given to it by the courts of foreign
countries or other states is the result of that international comity
(more properly called 'private international law') which is the
product of modern civilization. Hornthalv. Burwell, 109 N. C.
10, 13 S. E. Rep. 721. It is left to each state or nation to say
how far it will recognize this comity, and to what extent it will
be permitted to control its own laws. It has, however, been very
generally settled that all matters bearing upon the execution,
the interpretation, and the validity of a contract are to be determined by the law of the place where the contract is made,
and, if valid there, it is valid everywhere. Taylor v. Sharp, 108
N. C. 377, 13 S.E. Rep. 138."
"An exception is maintained by some of the continental
jurists as to the capacity of a contracting party, and they generally hold that tho capacity of the domicile attaches to and follows the person, wherever, he may go. 'We remarked in Taylor
v. Sharp, supra, that this was not considered by Mr. Justice
Story (Confi. Law, 103, 104) as the doctrine of the common law;
and we also stated the conclusion of Gray, C. J., in Milliken v.
Pratt,supra, that the general current of the English and American authorities is in favor of holding that a contract which, by
the law of the place, is recognized as lawfully made by a capable
person, is valid everywhere, although the person would not under the law of the domicile, be deemed capable of making it.
The proposition, though denied by Dr. Wharton as to infants
and femes covert (Confl. Laws, 112, 118), seems to be generally
facts, how can the courts of state A nullify the effect given to such operative facts,
by state B? If state B had the power to create 'vested rights', so far as state A
is concerned, why should such rights not be entitled to recognition if called in question in state A? Is it not strange to argue in the first place that state A has no
choice in accepting the original rule and then to admit that it has the power to set
aside the effect of that rule whenever it pleases on the plea that such recognition
sr enforcement would violate its public policy?"
- 112 N. C. 59, 17 S. E. 14, 25 L. IR. A. 188, 34 Am. St. Rep. 473 (1893).
V Supra, n. 56, at p. 60 et seq.
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accepted in this country, in so far as it relates to the enforcement
of contracts in courts other than those of the domicile. If, for
exam)?le, the plantiffs were suing upon the present contract in
the courts of Maryland, the defendant could not, it is thought,
avail herself of the incapacity of her domicile, but the lex loci
contractus would prevail."
"But quite a different question is presented when the action
is brought in the forum of the domicile. In such a case a very
important qualification of private international law is to be considered; and this is that no state or nation will enforce a foreign law which is contrary to its fixed and settled policy. In
Bank v. Earle,13 Pet. 519, Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the
court, said: 'The comity thus extended to other nations is no
impeachment of sovereignty. It is the voluntary act of the
nation by which it is offered, and is inadmissible when contrary
to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests.' To the same effect
is the language of Story,-that no state will enforce a foreign
law if it be 'repugnant to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests.' Confi. Law, 37. That this qualifying principle is applicable to cases like the present is manifest, not only by reason and
necessity, but also by the decisions of other courts. Even in
Milliken v. Pratt,supra, in which the lex loci contractus is pushed to the extreme limit, it is suggested that where the incapacity
of a married woman is the settled policy of the state, 'for the
protection of its own citizens, it could not be held by the courts
of that state to yield to the law of another state, in which she
might undertake to contract.' In Robinson v. Queen, 87 Tenn.
445, 11 S. W. Rep. 38, the contract was made by the ferne defendant in Kentucy, where she resided, and under whose laws
she was- capable of contracting. An action was brought in Tennessee, and the court held, as we did in the similar case of Taylor
v. Sharp, supra, and Wood v. Wheeler, 111 N. C. 232, 16 S. E.
Rep. 418, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The court,
however, said: 'If this were a suit against a married woman,
a citizen of this state, on a contract made out of the state, there
would be much force in the insistence of the defendant.' In
Johnston v. Gawtry, 11 Mo. App. 322, it was held that where a
married woman, having a separate estate in land in Missouri,
makes a contract in another state, her capacity to make the contract, and its validity, are to be determined by the law of Missouri, in a suit in a Missouri Court to enforce such contract."
"In Bank v. Williams, 46 Miss. 618, the contract was made in
Louisiana, where it would have been valid against the feme defendant. The suit was brought in Mississippi, the place of her
domicile, and under whose laws the contract was void by reason
of her coverture. " 1' The court said: 'It is the prerogative of
the sovereignty of every country to define the conditions of its
members-not merely its resident inhabitants, but others tern-
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porarily there-as to capacity and incapacity. But capacity
or incapacity, as to acts done in a foreign country, where the
person may be temporarily, will be recognized as valid or not,
in the forum of his domicile, as they may infringe or not its interests, laws and policies' * * * the enforcement of the present
contract is wholly repugnant to our domestic policy, as well as
prejudicial to the interests of our citizens. It is not pretended
that the defendant has attempted to charge her separate estate
in any manner provided by our laws; and to hold that she may
subject it to execution upon a personal judgment, by reason of
a promise made during a short visit to another state, or, as in
this case, by a simple order for goods, would afford an easy
method of charging her property, in contravention of the public
policy and laws of the domicile."
The last two cases discussed in the above quotation, were ones in
which the domicile of the married woman, whose contractual capacity was to be determined, was in the state of the forum, the agreement having been made or treated by the court as made elsewhere.
In Robinson v. Queen, 8 the domicile of the married woman concerned was in Kentucky, where she had signed as surety for a firm
of which her husband was a member, certain promissory notes
which were payable in Kentucy, where the makers and payees as
well as she, herself, were domiciled. The domestic rule of Kentucky at this time was that a married woman was under no disability from making such a contract; that of Tennessee was to the
contrary. Here the only element distinguishing this from a purely
domwestic case was that the forum was not that of the state in which
the operative facts took place. It could not be called a conflict of
laws case in the sense that part thereof had occurred in two different jurisdictions. The local rule of Kentucky in regard to the
contractual capacity of a married woman would certainly seem to
be inescapable of application by the court in the sense of being
"binding" i. e., compulsory, if the local rule of one jurisdiction is
ever binding upon another. Yet we know that Kentucky would
be powerless to prevent the Tennessee court from deciding contrary to the Kentucky domestic rule and in accord with the Tennessee domestic rule. It would be, and was in this case, purely a
matter of volition on the part of the Tennessee court as to what
rule it would apply. Kentucky could not impose its local rule on
the Tennessee court and certainly the Tennessee local rule did not
apply to this case, which comprised events happening entirely in
87 Tenu. 445, II S. W. 38 (1888).
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Kentucky, for Tennessee could not impose its local rule on Kentucky. The proposition simply was what decision should be made,
what rule for Tennessee should be laid down, by the court in this
case. Counsel contended that as the promissory note of a married
woman was void under the local laws of Tennessee, and as it was
the fixed policy of Tennessee to throw around married women the
shield of disability the court should not even under a supposed
obligation of comity, allow a recovery based on such an agreement.
But the court upheld the contract of the married woman without
using language carrying the conception that a Kentucky rule of
law could be binding on a Tennessee court, saying: " * o 0 It may
now be said to be settled law, that the validity of a contract, the
obligation thereof, and capacity of the parties thereto, is to be determined by the lex loci eontratus (in the sense of the place of performance) unless there is something in the contract which is deemed harmful to the good morals, or injurious to the rights of its own
citizens, by the laws of the state or country whose courts are called
upon to enforce the contract made in a foreign state or country.' ' 9
The only implication that that might be possible seems to be in
the following statement made by the court (which apparently carried the assumption that there may really be a conflict between the
Kentucky and Tennessee domestic rules). The court said: "If
this were a suit against a married woman, a citizen of this state, on
a contract made out of the state, there would be much force in the
insistence of the defendant. But here the law of the domicile is
the same as the law of the contract and the law of the forum" '0
Now we have seen above that there cannot possibly be a conflict,
for a Kentucky rule cannot be "law" for a Tennessee court. The
problem here, as usual, simply is: there being two opposite local
rules, each of which might be applicable, if the facts were differ.
ent, what conflict of laws rule should be laid down as "law" by
the forum, since neither of the opposite local rules applies as law
in the case?
That is a question, the answer to which, as in the solution of 8all
'1
legal problems, should be based fundamentally on "policy.
"Perhaps," says Mr. Justice Holmes,62 "one of the reasons why
59 Supra, n. 58, at p. 446.
60 Supra, n. 58, at p. 447.
1 LORENEZN, op. cit. supra, n. 55, at p 748: "The correct mode of approach to
this subject would strip it of all fictions and deal with all phenomena a posterlori.
Thus viewed wa find that each sovereign state can determine the rules of the Conflict of Laws In accordance with its own notions of what Is Just and proper, and so
far as the individual states of this country are not bound by some constitutonal
provision, they have the same power."
02 8 HAnv. L. REv. 1. 9.
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judges do not like to discuss questions of policy, or put a decision
in terms upon their views as law-nlakers, is that the moment you
leave the path of mere logical deduction you lose the illusion of
certainty which makes legal reasoning seem. like mathematics. But
the certainty is only an illusion nevertheless. Views of policy are
taught by experience of the interests of life."
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